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The Collaborative Clearinghouse for Lawsuits and Other Claims Against ACE Group Insurance Companies

COLEMAN et al v. WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC. et al

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Case Number: 
1:14-cv-03566 Search Pacer
ACE Group party(s): 
Opposing Party: 
Monica Coleman
Court Type: 
Federal
US District Court: 
Northern District of Georgia
Date Filed: 
Nov 5 2014

COMPLAINT
COME NOW, Plaintiffs in the above-styled action, and hereby file this Complaint,
demanding a jury trial and showing this Honorable Court the following:
1 .
On December 14, 2013, Defendant Claude Mobley, an employee and/or agent of Werner
Enterprises, Inc. (“Werner”), was driving a Werner tractor and hauling a Wal-Mart
Transportation, LLC (“Wal-Mart”) trailer on 1-285 northbound in Fulton County, Georgia.
Defendant Mobley was traveling too fast for the rainy conditions and lost control of the tractortrailer,
which jackknifed and struck the median wall, blocking portions of 1-285 northbound and
strewing debris across 1-285 southbound. As Defendant Mobley’s tractor-trailer was
jackknifing, Defendant Jon Cromwell, an employee, statutory employee, and/or agent of
Flagship Transportation, LLC (“Flagship”) and/or N.R.W., Inc. (“NRW”) and driving a tractortrailer
owned by NRW and leased by Flagship, came upon Mobley’s tractor-trailer while driving
on 1-285 northbound. Because he, too, was traveling too fast for conditions, following too
closely, and because he failed to maintain a proper lookout, Defendant Cromwell abruptly and
without warning swerved left and into another lane of 1-285 northbound. In doing so, Defendant
Cromwell struck Sanford Ronald Coleman’s vehicle in the rear with tremendous force,
catapulting Mr. Coleman’s vehicle across 1-285 northbound, through the emergency lane on the
right shoulder of the interstate and through a fence. Mr. Coleman’s vehicle ultimately came to
rest on Harwell Road, which adjoins 1-285 northbound. After consciously suffering, Mr.
Coleman died as a result of the injuries he sustained in the wreck.
2.
The claims asserted by Plaintiffs against Defendants arise out of the collision described in
the preceding paragraph.
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
3.
Monica Coleman, Surviving Spouse of Sanford Ronald Coleman and Executor of the
Estate of Sanford Ronald Coleman, deceased, is a resident of the State of Georgia.
4.
Defendant Werner Enterprises, Inc. is a Nebraska corporation with its principal business
address located at P.O. Box 45308, Omaha, Nebraska, 68145-0308. Werner maintains a
registered agent for service of process in Douglas County, Georgia, Duane Beck, who may be
served with legal process at 1444 Blairs Bridge Road, Lithia Springs, Georgia, 30122.
5.
Defendant Werner is engaged in business as an interstate motor carrier transporting goods
for compensation and does business in Georgia, including in and through Fulton County,
Georgia.
6.
Defendant Flagship Transportation, LLC is a Kentucky corporation with its principal
business address located at 4701 Jennings Lane, Louisville, Kentucky, 40218. Flagship does not
maintain an office or a registered agent for service of process in this State, Defendant Flagship
may be served with legal process by serving its registered agent for service in Kentucky, Ivan J.
Schell, 500 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 2400, Louisville, Kentucky, 40202, pursuant to the
Georgia Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-94. Alternatively, service is proper on the
Secretary of State pursuant to the Georgia Non-Resident Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-12-1 et
seq,
7.
Defendant Flagship is engaged in business as an interstate motor carrier transporting
goods for compensation and does business in Georgia, including in and through Fulton County,
Georgia.
8.
Defendant N.R.W., Inc. is a Kentucky corporation with its principal business address
located at 2512 Goldsmith Lane, Louisville, Kentucky, 40218. NRW does not maintain an office
or a registered agent for service of process in this State. Defendant NRW may be served with
legal process by serving its registered agent for service in Kentucky, Neal Ray Wantye, 2512
Goldsmith Lane, Louisville, Kentucky, 40218, pursuant to the Georgia Long Arm Statute,
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O.C.G.A. § 9-10-94. Alternatively, service is proper on the Secretary of State pursuant to the
Georgia Non-Resident Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-12-1 etseq.
9.
Defendant NRW is engaged in business as an interstate motor carrier transporting goods
for compensation and does business in Georgia, including in and through Fulton County,
Georgia.
10.
Defendant Wal-Mart Transportation, LLC is a Delaware corporation with its principal
business address located at 702 SW 8th Street, Bentonville, Arkansas, 72716. Wal-Mart
maintains a registered agent for service of process in Gwinnett County, Corporation Process
Company, which may be served with process at 2180 Satellite Blvd. Suite 400, Duluth, Gwinnett
County, Georgia, 30097.
11.
Defendant Wal-Mart is engaged in business as an interstate motor carrier transporting
goods for compensation and does business in Georgia, including in and through Fulton County,
Georgia.
12.
Defendant Ace American Insurance Company (“Ace American”) is an insurance
company organized and existing under the laws of Pennsylvania with its principal business
address located at 436 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19106. Ace American may be
served with legal process by serving its registered agent for service, Mark G. Irwin, 500 Colonial
Center Parkway #200, Roswell, Fulton County, Georgia, 30076.
13.
Defendant National Casualty Company (“National Casualty”) is an insurance company
organized and existing under the laws of Wisconsin with its principal business address located at
8877 North Gainey Center Drive, Scottsdale, Arizona, 85258. National Casualty may be served
with legal process by serving its registered agent for service, Corporation Service Company, 40
Technology Parkway South #300, Norcross, Gwinnett County, Georgia, 30092.
14.
Defendant Claude Reginald Mobley is a resident of St. Augustine, Saint Johns County,
Florida. Defendant Mobley may be served with legal process by serving him at his residence,
159 Blanco Street, St. Augustine, Florida, 32084 pursuant to the Georgia Long Arm statute,
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-94. Alternatively, service is proper on the Secretary of State pursuant to the
Georgia Non-Resident Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-12-1 etseq.
15.
Defendant Jon Paul Cromwell is a resident of Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky.
Defendant Cromwell may be served with legal process by serving him at his residence, 907
Thruston Drive, Louisville, Kentucky, 40217, pursuant to the Georgia Long Arm statute,
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-94. Alternatively, service is proper on the Secretary of State pursuant to the
Georgia Non-Resident Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. §40-12-1 etseq.
16.
Defendant Werner is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court because it is authorized to
and does transact business in the State of Georgia.
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17.
Venue is proper in this Court with respect to Defendant Werner pursuant to O.C.G.A. §
40-1-117(b), O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4), and other applicable law.
18.
Defendant Flagship is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to authorities
including the Georgia Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, and the Georgia Non-Resident
Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-12-3.
19.
Venue is proper in this Court with respect to Defendant Flagship pursuant to O.C.G.A. §
40-1-117(b), O.C.G.A. § 40-12-3, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93 and other applicable law.
20.
Defendant NRW is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to authorities
including the Georgia Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, and the Georgia Non-Resident
Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-12-3.
21.
Venue is proper in this Court with respect to Defendant NRW pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-
1-117(b), O.C.G.A. § 40-12-3, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93 and other applicable law.
22.
Defendant Wal-Mart is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court because it is authorized to
and does transact business in the State of Georgia.
23.
Venue is proper in this Court with respect to Defendant Wal-Mart pursuant to O.C.G.A. §
40-1-117(b), O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4), and other applicable law.
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24.
Defendant Ace American is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court because it is
authorized to and does transact business in the State of Georgia. Ace American is properly
named and may be properly joined in this action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c), O.C.G.A. §
40-2-140(d)(4), and other applicable law.
25.
Venue is proper in this Court as to Ace American pursuant to multiple authorities,
including O.C.G.A. §§ 33-4-1(2) and (4) and O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-510(b)(3) and (4).
26.
Defendant National Casualty is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court because it is
authorized to and does transact business in the State of Georgia. National Casualty is properly
named and may be properly joined in this action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c), O.C.G.A. §
40-2-140(d)(4), and other applicable law.
27.
Venue is proper in this Court as to National Casualty pursuant to multiple authorities,
including O.C.G.A. §§ 33-4-1(2) and (4) and O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(3) and (4).
28.
Defendant Mobley is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to authorities
including the Georgia Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, and the Georgia Non-Resident
Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-12-3.
29.
Venue is proper in this Court with respect to Defendant Mobley pursuant to multiple
authorities, including O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93 and O.C.G.A. § 40-12-3.
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30.
Defendant Cromwell is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to authorities
including the Georgia Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, and the Georgia Non-Resident
Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-12-3.
31.
Venue is proper in this Court with respect to Defendant Cromwell pursuant to multiple
authorities, including O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93 and O.C.G.A. § 40-12-3.
32.
Defendant Ace American provided liability insurance coverage to Defendant Werner and
Defendant Mobley for this collision under Policy Number XSAH087207A.
33.
Defendant National Casualty provided liability insurance coverage to Defendant
Flagship, Defendant NRW, and Defendant Cromwell for this collision under Policy Number
LT00000614.
34.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted in this Complaint.
OPERATIVE FACTS
35.
On December 14, 2013, at approximately 8:40 a.m., Defendant Claude Mobley was
driving a tractor owned by Werner and hauling a trailer owned by Wal-Mart on 1-285
northbound in Fulton County, Georgia.
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36.
It was raining, the roadway was wet, and Defendant Mobley was traveling too fast for the
conditions.
37.
Despite being a professional driver, Defendant Mobley negligently lost control of the
tractor-trailer he was driving and it began to jackknife on 1-285 northbound. The tractor-trailer
ultimately struck the median wall separating the northbound and southbound lanes of 1-285 with
such force that it caused significant damage to the wall, strewing debris into and across the
southbound lanes of 1-285.
38.
While jackknifing and after Defendant Mobley’s tractor-trailer came to rest, it was
blocking portions of 1-285 northbound.
39.
As Defendant Mobley’s tractor-trailer was jackknifing, Defendant Jon Paul Cromwell
was also traveling on 1-285 northbound.
40.
Defendant Cromwell was driving a tractor-trailer owned by NRW and leased to Flagship
pursuant to a Long Term Equipment Lease in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 376.11 and 376.12.
41.
Like Defendant Mobley, Defendant Cromwell was traveling too fast for the rainy
conditions. He was also following too closely and not maintaining a proper lookout.
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42.
When vehicles in front of Defendant Cromwell began to slow as a result of the
jackknifing Werner truck and Wal-Mart trailer, Defendant Cromwell was unable to safely slow
his tractor-trailer because he was following too closely and traveling too fast for the conditions.
Instead of safely slowing his tractor-trailer, Defendant Cromwell swerved abruptly to the left in
an effort to change lanes.
43.
When Defendant Cromwell swerved left, he was still traveling too fast for the conditions
and negligently slammed his large tractor-trailer into the left rear of a Swift Transportation
Company tractor-trailer and then into the rear of Sanford Ronald Coleman’s vehicle.
44.
Sanford Ronald Coleman was a totally innocent victim and could have done nothing to
avoid his vehicle being unexpectedly struck in the rear by the large tractor-trailer driven by
Defendant Cromwell.
45.
Defendant Cromwell’s tractor-trailer struck Mr. Coleman’s vehicle with such tremendous
force that it catapulted Mr. Coleman’s vehicle across 1-285 northbound, through the right
emergency lane, through a fence, and into an adjacent roadway where Mr. Coleman’s vehicle
finally came to rest.
46.
Mr. Coleman was seriously injured as a result of the wreck. Mr. Coleman ultimately
succumbed to the fatal injuries he sustained in this wreck and was pronounced dead after being
transported to Grady Hospital in Atlanta.
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47.
Sanford Ronald Coleman was an innocent victim who in no way contributed to causing
either Defendant Mobley’s tractor-trailer to jackknife or Defendant Cromwell’s tractor-trailer to
strike his vehicle in the rear on December 14, 2013.
48.
The December 14, 2013 collision was caused by the negligence of Defendants either
alone or in conjunction with one another.
49.
Defendant Mobley was charged with driving too fast for conditions and failure to
maintain lane.
50.
Defendant Cromwell was charged with following too closely, failure to maintain lane,
and second degree vehicular homicide.
51.
The December 14, 2013 collision was foreseeable to Defendants and could have been
avoided had the Defendants acted in a safe and prudent manner as required by Georgia law and
in accordance with the standards required of professional truck drivers.
52.
At the time of the December 14, 2013 collision, Mobley was operating the Werner
commercial motor vehicle as an employee and/or agent of Werner.
53.
At the time of the subject wreck, Mobley was acting in the course and scope of his
employment with Werner.
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54.
At the time of the subject wreck, Mobley was operating the Werner commercial motor
vehicle in the scope of his employment and in furtherance of Werner’s business.
55.
At the time of the December 14, 2013 collision, Cromwell was operating the tractortrailer
he was driving as an employee, statutory employee, and/or agent of Flagship.
56.
At the time of the subject wreck, Cromwell was acting in the course and scope of his
employment and/or agency with Flagship.
57.
At the time of the subject wreck, Cromwell was operating the tractor-trailer he was
driving in the scope of his employment and in furtherance of Flagship’s business.
58.
At the time of the December 14, 2013 collision, Cromwell was operating the tractortrailer
he was driving as an employee and/or agent of NRW.
59.
At the time of the subject wreck, Cromwell was acting in the course and scope of his
employment and/or agency with NRW.
60.
At the time of the subject wreck, Cromwell was operating the tractor-trailer he was
driving in the scope of his employment and in furtherance of NRW’s business.
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61.
At the time of the subject wreck, Ace American Policy Number XSAH087207A was in
force and covered Defendants Werner and Mobley for their liability for the collision.
62.
At the time of the subject wreck, National Casualty Policy Number LT00000614 was in
force and covered Defendants Flagship, NRW, and Cromwell for their liability for the collision.
63.
As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ negligence, Mr. Coleman was fatally
injured and later died.
64.
Prior to and during the wreck, Mr. Coleman experienced shock, fright, and terror.
65.
Mr. Coleman suffered severe and painful injuries to his body and mind as a result of the
injuries he sustained in the wreck, but before he died on December 14, 2013 from the fatal
injuries he sustained in the wreck.
LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT MOBLEY
66.
Plaintiffs re-allege and reincorporate Paragraphs 1-65 as if fully set forth herein verbatim.
67.
Defendant Mobley had a duty to operate his commercial vehicle in a safe and prudent
manner in accordance with his training as a professional driver and so as not to endanger the
lives and welfare of Mr. Coleman and the motoring public. This duty included keeping a proper
lookout, paying attention, maintaining his lane, and operating his commercial vehicle at a
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reasonable and prudent speed in accordance with the conditions of the roadway and all traffic
laws and regulations.
68.
As a professional truck driver, Defendant Mobley also had a duty to operate his tractortrailer
in accordance with the heightened standards required of commercial vehicle drivers and in
accordance with his training and the CDL manual.
69.
Defendant Mobley breached those duties and is liable for his tortious acts and omissions,
which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Violating pertinent rules of the road, with such violations amounting to negligence per se.
The pertinent violations include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Failing to operate his vehicle at a safe and prudent speed and traveling too
fast for conditions in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180;
(2) Failing to operate his vehicle with due care, in violation of O.C.G.A. §
40-6-241;
(3) Driving a vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property,
in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-390; and
(4) Failing to maintain lane, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48.
(b) Failing to operate the vehicle in a safe and prudent manner, thereby placing the
lives and well-being of the public in general, and Mr. Coleman in particular, in
grave danger;
(c) Failing to operate the vehicle in accordance with state and federal law and
regulations; and
(d) Negligently jackknifing his tractor-trailer on a busy roadway, placing in danger the
lives and welfare of the motoring public in general and Sanford Ronald Coleman
in particular.
70.
As a result of the foregoing breaches of duties, Sanford Ronald Coleman suffered the
losses and injuries noted herein and died.
71.
Alone or in conjunction with the negligence of Defendants Cromwell, Werner, Wal-Mart,
NRW, and Flagship, Defendant Mobley’s negligence proximately caused the injuries to and
death of Mr. Coleman.
72.
The conduct of Defendant Mobley demonstrates wantonness, oppression, or that entire
want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences such
that punitive damages should be awarded against him pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1.
LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT CROMWELL
73.
Plaintiffs re-allege and reincorporate Paragraphs 1-72 as if fully set forth herein verbatim.
74.
Defendant Cromwell had a duty to operate his commercial vehicle in a safe and prudent
manner in accordance with his training as a professional driver so as not to endanger the lives
and welfare of Mr. Coleman and the motoring public. This duty included keeping a proper
lookout, paying attention, and operating his commercial vehicle at a reasonable and prudent
speed in accordance with all traffic laws and regulations.
75.
As a professional truck driver, Defendant Cromwell also had a duty to operate his tractortrailer
in accordance with the heightened standards required of commercial vehicle drivers and in
accordance with his training and the CDL manual.
76.
Defendant Cromwell breached those duties and is liable for his tortious acts and
omissions, which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) Violating pertinent rules of the road, with such violations amounting to
negligence per se. The pertinent violations include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) Failing to operate his vehicle at a safe and prudent speed and traveling too
fast for conditions, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180;
(2) Failing to operate his vehicle with due care, in violation of O.C.G.A. §
40-6-241;
(3) Driving a vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property,
in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-390;
(4) Following too closely, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49;
(5) Making an improper lane change, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48; and
(6) Making an erratic lane change, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-123.
(b) Failing to operate the vehicle in a safe and prudent manner, thereby placing the
lives and well-being of the public in general, and Mr. Coleman in particular, in
grave danger;
(c) Failing to operate the vehicle in accordance with state and federal law and
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regulations; and
(d) Negligently following too closely and traveling too fast for the conditions, which
caused him to slam his tractor-trailer into the rear of Mr. Coleman’s vehicle.
77.
As a result of the foregoing breaches of duties, Sanford Ronald Coleman suffered the
losses and injuries noted herein and died.
78.
Alone or in conjunction with the negligence of Defendants Mobley, Werner, Wal-Mart,
NRW, and Flagship, Defendant Cromwell’s negligence proximately caused the injuries to and
death of Mr. Coleman.
79.
The conduct of Defendant Cromwell demonstrates wantonness, oppression, or that entire
want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences such
that punitive damages should be awarded against him pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1.
LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT WERNER
80.
Plaintiffs re-allege and reincorporate Paragraphs 1-79 as if fully set forth herein verbatim.
81.
Defendant Werner is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the tortious acts
and omissions of its agents, employees, members, representatives, servants, or contractors
pursuant to O.C.G.A § 51-2-2, O.C.G.A § 51-2-5, and other applicable law. These acts and
omissions include, but are not limited to, the acts and omissions committed by Defendant
Mobley on December 14, 2013, which are described above.
82.
In addition, Defendant Werner, negligently selected, hired, trained, supervised, retained,
qualified, and/or entrusted Defendant Mobley as a driver of a commercial vehicle.
83.
Defendant Werner further failed to ensure that its tractor-trailer and driver complied with
federal and state laws and regulations.
84.
Defendant Werner failed to properly inspect, maintain, service, or repair the tractor
Mobley was driving.
85.
As a result of the foregoing breaches of duties, Sanford Ronald Coleman suffered the
losses and injuries noted herein and died.
86.
Alone or in conjunction with the negligence of Defendants Mobley, Cromwell, Wal-
Mart, NRW, and Flagship, the negligence of Defendant Werner proximately caused the injuries
to and death of Sanford Ronald Coleman.
87.
The conduct of Defendant Werner demonstrates wantonness, oppression, or that entire
want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences such
that punitive damages should be awarded against it pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1.
LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT FLAGSHIP
88.
Plaintiffs re-allege and reincorporate Paragraphs 1-87 as if fully set forth herein verbatim.
89.
Defendant Flagship is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the tortious
acts and omissions of its agents, employees, statutory employees, members, representatives,
servants, or contractors pursuant to O.C.G.A § 51-2-2, O.C.G.A § 51-2-5, O.C.G.A § 14-11-301,
and other applicable law. These acts and omissions include, but are not limited to, the acts and
omissions committed by Defendant Cromwell on December 14, 2013, which are described
above.
90.
In addition, Defendant Flagship, negligently selected, hired, trained, supervised, retained,
qualified, and/or entrusted Defendant Cromwell as a driver of a commercial vehicle.
91.
Defendant Flagship further failed to ensure that its tractor-trailer and driver complied
with federal and state laws and regulations.
92.
Defendant Flagship failed to properly inspect, maintain, service, or repair the tractortrailer
Cromwell was driving.
93.
As a result of the foregoing breaches of duties, Sanford Ronald Coleman suffered the
losses and injuries noted herein and died.
94.
Alone or in conjunction with the negligence of Defendants Mobley, Cromwell, Werner,
NRW, and Wal-Mart the negligence of Defendant Flagship proximately caused the injuries to
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and death of Sanford Ronald Coleman.
95,
The conduct of Defendant Flagship demonstrates wantonness, oppression, or that entire
want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences such
that punitive damages should be awarded against them pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1.
LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT NRW
96.
Plaintiffs re-allege and reincorporate Paragraphs 1-95 as if fully set forth herein verbatim.
97.
Defendant NRW is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the tortious acts
and omissions of its agents, employees, statutory employees, members, representatives, servants,
or contractors pursuant to O.C.G.A § 51-2-2, O.C.G.A § 51-2-5, O.C.G.A § 14-11-301, and other
applicable law. These acts and omissions include, but are not limited to, the acts and omissions
committed by Defendant Cromwell on December 14, 2013, which are described above.
98.
In addition, Defendant NRW, negligently selected, hired, trained, supervised, retained,
qualified, and/or entrusted Defendant Cromwell as a driver of a commercial vehicle.
99.
Defendant NRW further failed to ensure that its tractor-trailer and driver complied with
federal and state laws and regulations.
100.
Defendant NRW failed to properly inspect, maintain, service, or repair the tractor-trailer
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Cromwell was driving.
101.
As a result of the foregoing breaches of duties, Sanford Ronald Coleman suffered the
losses and injuries noted herein and died.
102.
Alone or in conjunction with the negligence of Defendants Mobley, Cromwell, Werner,
Flagship, and Wal-Mart the negligence of Defendant NRW proximately caused the injuries to
and death of Sanford Ronald Coleman.
103.
The conduct of Defendant NRW demonstrates wantonness, oppression, or that entire
want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences such
that punitive damages should be awarded against them pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1.
LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT WAL-MART
104.
Plaintiffs re-allege and reincorporate Paragraphs 1-103 as if fully set forth herein
verbatim.
105.
Defendant Wal-Mart failed to properly inspect, maintain, service, or repair the trailer
Defendant Mobley was hauling with the Werner tractor at the time of the subject wreck.
106.
Defendant Wal-Mart further failed to ensure that its trailer complied with federal and
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state laws and regulations.
107.
As a result of the foregoing breaches of duties, Sanford Ronald Coleman suffered the
losses and injuries noted herein and died.
108.
Alone or in conjunction with the negligence of Defendants Mobley, Cromwell, Werner,
NRW, and Flagship, the negligence of Defendant Wal-Mart proximately caused the injuries to
and death of Sanford Ronald Coleman.
LIABILITY OF ACE AMERICAN
109.
Plaintiffs re-allege and reincorporate Paragraphs 1-108 as if fully set forth herein
verbatim.
110.
Defendant Ace American provided liability coverage in the event of a motor vehicle
collision involving the Werner tractor involved in the subject wreck and Werner’s employees
and/or agents, including Defendant Mobley.
111.
Plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries under said contract or policies of insurance.
112.
Plaintiffs are entitled to receive payments from Defendant Ace American for the tort
liability of Defendants Werner and Mobley.
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LIABILITY OF NATIONAL CASUALTY
113.
Plaintiffs re-allege and reincorporate Paragraphs 1-112 as if fully set forth herein
verbatim.
114.
Defendant National Casualty provided liability coverage in the event of a motor vehicle
collision involving the tractor-trailer driven by Defendant Cromwell and involved in the subject
wreck and the employees, statutory employees, and/or agents of Defendants Flagship and/or
NRW, including Defendant Cromwell.
115.
Plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries under said contract or policies of insurance.
116.
Plaintiffs are entitled to receive payments from Defendant National Casualty for the tort
liability of Defendants Flagship and/or NRW and Cromwell.
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
117.
Plaintiffs re-allege and reincorporate Paragraphs 1-116 as if fully set forth herein
verbatim.
118.
Defendants jointly and concurrently committed tortious acts and omissions. Accordingly,
all Defendants are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiffs for the claims described herein.
DAMAGES CLAIMED
119.
The damages claimed by Plaintiffs were proximately caused by the tortious acts and
omissions of Defendants, for which they are liable jointly and severally.
120.
Plaintiff Monica Coleman, as Executor of the Estate of Sanford Ronald Coleman,
deceased, claims all damages suffered by Mr. Coleman for which his Estate is entitled to recover,
including the following:
(a) pre-impact and post-impact shock, fright, and terror Mr. Coleman experienced
prior to his death;
(b) all components of the mental and physical pain and suffering endured by Mr.
Coleman from the time of the wreck until he died, which shall include the postimpact
fright, shock, and terror he endured;
(c) medical bills, emergency transportation expenses, funeral and burial expenses;
and
(d) punitive damages to punish and deter Defendants pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-
5.1 et seq. and other law.
121.
Plaintiff Monica Coleman, as surviving spouse of Sanford Ronald Coleman, deceased,
claims compensatory damages for the wrongful death of Mr. Coleman, the measure of which
under Georgia law is the full value of his life, both economic and intangible, as determined by
the enlightened conscience of a fair and impartial jury.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
122.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
(a) That summons issue requiring the Defendants to appear as provided by law to
answer this Complaint;
(b) That Plaintiffs have and recover all damages for all losses compensable under
Georgia law as set forth above;
(c) That all attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs be cast against the Defendants;
(d) That service be had on the Defendants as provided by law;
(e) That the Court award punitive damages against Defendants; and
(f) For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

The provided text is an excerpt from a document filed in this case. For a full understanding of the case, one should read the complete court file, including the response.

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